Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester

Departamento de Economía y de Historia Económica

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › Investigación › revisión exhaustiva

1 Cita (Scopus)

Resumen

Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	172-174
Publicación	Economics Letters
Volumen	115
N.º	2
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032
Estado	Publicada - 1 may 2012

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title = "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice",

abstract = "Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. {\textcopyright} 2011 Elsevier B.V.",

keywords = "Naive players, School choice, Veil of ignorance, Welfare",

author = "Jose Apesteguia and Ballester, \{Miguel A.\}",

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AU - Ballester, Miguel A.

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AB - Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Naive players

KW - School choice

KW - Veil of ignorance

KW - Welfare

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855775696

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 115

SP - 172

EP - 174

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

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