Voting by committees under constraints

Salvador Barberà; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

Voting by committees under constraints

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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Resumen

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Idioma original	Inglés
Editorial	BSE Working Papers
Estado	Publicada - jul 2003

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Nombre	BSE Working Papers
N.º	7

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https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/voting-committees-under-constraintsLicencia: C In Copyright

1 Terminado

Grups, xarxes i coalicions en la presa de decisions col·lectives
Massó, J. (Principal Investigator), Barberà, S. (Investigador/a Principal 2), Calvó Armengol, A. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Klaus ., B.-E. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Klijn , F. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Dutta, B. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. J. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCYT)
1/12/02 → 1/12/05
Proyecto: Proyectos y Ayudas de Investigación

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M3 - Working paper

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Voting by committees under constraints

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Grups, xarxes i coalicions en la presa de decisions col·lectives

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