Philosophy and cognitive science on spatial and temporal experience

Olga Fernández-Prat*, Daniel Quesada

*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículoInvestigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

The study of the contrast between fundamental aspects of spatial and temporal awareness offers a good opportunity to bring to light the relation between philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness. In this paper we critically examine important work by Rick Grush on spatial and temporal experience, and we show that while there is a valid claim for the relevant neuroscientific model to be one that supports Gareth Evans's stance on "behavioral space", there is not at present any scientific model that offers comparable support for philosophical theories of temporal experience, despite some claims by Grush that might suggest the contrary. Moreover, we argue that careful attention to the spatial case allows us to locate the point at which even relatively successful cases of neuroscientific modeling and explanation are left wanting when their aim is to show that phenomenal features of experience are a function of the representational structures produced by our neural information-processing machinery: an aim widely shared by the predominant programmatic stance in current neuroscience research.
Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)9089-9108
Número de páginas20
PublicaciónSynthese
Volumen199
N.º3-4
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 12 may 2021

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