Organizational Structure and Technological Investment

Inés Macho-Stadler, Noriaki Matsushima*, Ryusuke Shinohara

*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículoInvestigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

4 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We analyze firms’ decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)785-816
Número de páginas32
PublicaciónJournal of industrial economics
Volumen69
N.º4
DOI
EstadoPublicada - dic 2021

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