On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículoInvestigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)83-97
Número de páginas15
PublicaciónTheory and Decision
Volumen84
N.º1
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 4 dic 2017

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