Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

Antonio Miralles; Marek Pycia

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303

Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

Antonio Miralles^*, Marek Pycia

^*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › Investigación › revisión exhaustiva

6 Citas (Scopus)

3 Descargas (Pure)

Resumen

Estudiamos la asignación de recursos discretos en un modelo general que abarca una amplia gama de entornos aplicados, como elección escolar, asignación de cursos y reasentamiento de refugiados. Permitimos demandas de unidades individuales y generales y cualquier restricción lineal. Demostramos el segundo teorema del bienestar para estos entornos y una versión fuerte del primer teorema del bienestar. De esta manera, establecemos una equivalencia entre la eficiencia fuerte y la descentralización a través de los precios en entornos discretos. Al demostrar que todos los resultados fuertemente eficientes pueden implementarse mediante pseudo mercados, proporcionamos una base para el uso de pseudo mercados en el diseño del mercado.

Idioma original	Inglés
Número de artículo	105303
Número de páginas	24
Publicación	Journal of economic theory
Volumen	196
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303
Estado	Publicación electrónica previa a su impresión - 16 jun 2021

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ODS 10: Reducción de las desigualdades
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title = "Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources",

abstract = "We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.",

keywords = "Complementarities, Constraints, Discrete markets, Multi-unit demand, Pseudomarkets, Random assignment, Single-unit demand, Walrasian equilibrium, Welfare theorems",

author = "Antonio Miralles and Marek Pycia",

note = "Miralles gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Ortygia Business School, UCLA, and Carnegie Mellon University, where most of the work has been undertaken, as well as the financial support from the Spanish Governments ( SEV-2015-0563 , ECO2017-83534P ) and the Catalan Government ( SGR2017 0711 ). Pycia gratefully acknowledges the support of UCLA , where he was a faculty member when working on this paper, as well as the support from the William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center at Princeton University .",

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AU - Miralles, Antonio

AU - Pycia, Marek

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N2 - We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.

AB - We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.

KW - Complementarities

KW - Constraints

KW - Discrete markets

KW - Multi-unit demand

KW - Pseudomarkets

KW - Random assignment

KW - Single-unit demand

KW - Walrasian equilibrium

KW - Welfare theorems

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303

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SN - 0022-0531

VL - 196

JO - Journal of economic theory

JF - Journal of economic theory

M1 - 105303

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Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

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