Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

Carmen Beviá

doi:10.1007/s100580050013

Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

Carmen Beviá

Departamento de Economía y de Historia Económica

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › Investigación › revisión exhaustiva

30 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	195-213
Publicación	Review of Economic Design
Volumen	3
N.º	3
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050013
Estado	Publicada - 1 ene 1998

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abstract = "In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag 1998.",

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Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

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