Balancing the power to appoint officers

Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

Balancing the power to appoint officers

Salvador Barberà, Danilo Coelho

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › Investigación › revisión exhaustiva

8 Citas (Scopus)

1 Descargas (Pure)

Resumen

Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	189-203
Número de páginas	15
Publicación	Games and Economic Behavior
Volumen	101
N.º	1
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005
Estado	Publicada - 1 ene 2017

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10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005Licencia: C In Copyright

1 Terminado

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (Principal Investigator), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Becario/a), Balart Castro, P. (Becario/a), Caramuta ., D. (Becario/a), Filippos , L. (Becario/a), Gjorgjiev, R. (Becario/a), Li , N. (Becario/a), Merlino , L. P. (Becario/a), Ozturk , T. (Becario/a), Bervoets ., S. J. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a contratado/a), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigador/a), Brown, D. J. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Coelho, D. (Investigador/a), Flamand ., S. (Investigador/a), Groenert ., V. (Investigador/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. O. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigador/a), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. (Investigador/a), Nicolo, A. (Investigador/a), Nozomu , M. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Proyecto: Proyectos y Ayudas de Investigación

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@article{5799989fb19d451bb40a9d4136d88233,

title = "Balancing the power to appoint officers",

abstract = "Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.",

keywords = "Constitutional design, Rule of k names, Strong Nash equilibrium, Voting rules",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Danilo Coelho",

note = "The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d{\textquoteright} Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informaci{\'o} through the Distinci{\'o} per a la Promoci{\'o} de la Recerca Universit{\`a}ria and grant SGR2009-0419. Salvador Barber{\`a} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and grant ECO2014 53051-P. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from the Brazilian Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, through CNPq Research Productivity Scholarship, grant no. CNPQ/PQ-2 302018/2012-3.",

year = "2017",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005",

language = "English",

volume = "101",

pages = "189--203",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Balancing the power to appoint officers

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Coelho, Danilo

N1 - The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d’ Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària and grant SGR2009-0419. Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and grant ECO2014 53051-P. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from the Brazilian Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, through CNPq Research Productivity Scholarship, grant no. CNPQ/PQ-2 302018/2012-3.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

AB - Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

KW - Constitutional design

KW - Rule of k names

KW - Strong Nash equilibrium

KW - Voting rules

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 101

SP - 189

EP - 203

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

Balancing the power to appoint officers

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Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

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