@techreport{2550326a601241949ed83045de13528c,
title = "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof",
abstract = "For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barber{\`a}, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.",
author = "Arribillaga, \{R. Pablo\} and J. Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
language = "English",
series = "BSE Working Paper",
publisher = "BSE Working Papers",
number = "1108",
address = "Spain",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "BSE Working Papers",
}