TY - JOUR
T1 - A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing
AU - van den Bergh, J.C.J.M
AU - Angelsen, Arild
AU - Baranzini, Andrea
AU - Botzen, W. J. Wouter
AU - Carattini, Stefano
AU - Drews, Stefan
AU - Dunlop, Tessa)
AU - Galbraith, Eric
AU - Gsottbauer, Elisabeth
AU - Howarth, Richard B.
AU - Padilla, Emilio
AU - Roca, Jordi
AU - Schmidt, Robert C.
N1 - Unidad de excelencia María de Maeztu CEX2019-000940-M
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Unilateral climate policies have been unable to achieve intended emissions reductions. We argue that international harmonization of climate policy beyond the Paris Agreement is the only way forward and that global carbon pricing, either through a tax or market, is the best available instrument to manage this. A foundation has already been laid, as current carbon pricing initiatives cover about 20% of global CO2 emissions. Since it limits free-riding by countries/jurisdictions, global carbon pricing is, in principle, behaviourally easier to negotiate than other instruments, such as emission targets or technical standards. To overcome political resistance, we propose a dynamic strategy consisting of two parallel tracks and five transition phases. The first track entails assembly of a carbon-pricing coalition that expands over time and exerts moral and economic pressure on non-members to join. The second track involves refocusing UN intergovernmental climate change negotiations on carbon pricing, potentially involving initially heterogeneous prices reflecting distinct income levels of countries, which then gradually converge. The dual tracks are designed to reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. The proposal results in a transition trajectory consisting of two interactive tracks and five phases, with specific attention to inequity within and among countries. We illustrate how such an approach could function with either a carbon tax or market.
AB - Unilateral climate policies have been unable to achieve intended emissions reductions. We argue that international harmonization of climate policy beyond the Paris Agreement is the only way forward and that global carbon pricing, either through a tax or market, is the best available instrument to manage this. A foundation has already been laid, as current carbon pricing initiatives cover about 20% of global CO2 emissions. Since it limits free-riding by countries/jurisdictions, global carbon pricing is, in principle, behaviourally easier to negotiate than other instruments, such as emission targets or technical standards. To overcome political resistance, we propose a dynamic strategy consisting of two parallel tracks and five transition phases. The first track entails assembly of a carbon-pricing coalition that expands over time and exerts moral and economic pressure on non-members to join. The second track involves refocusing UN intergovernmental climate change negotiations on carbon pricing, potentially involving initially heterogeneous prices reflecting distinct income levels of countries, which then gradually converge. The dual tracks are designed to reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. The proposal results in a transition trajectory consisting of two interactive tracks and five phases, with specific attention to inequity within and among countries. We illustrate how such an approach could function with either a carbon tax or market.
UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14693062.2020.1797618?needAccess=true&role=button
U2 - 10.1080/14693062.2020.1797618
DO - 10.1080/14693062.2020.1797618
M3 - Article
SN - 1469-3062
VL - 20
SP - 1057
EP - 1069
JO - Climate Policy
JF - Climate Policy
IS - 9
ER -