La política de defensa argentina en democracia: juridicidad, control y desmilitarización (1983-2007)

Abstract

In the study of transitions to democracy, little attention has been paid to defense policies. While civil-military relations are in the spotlight of democratic theory and are understood as a definitive element in the passage from authoritarian to elected governments, defense usually plays a marginal role. This deficient analysis of defense issues is justified by at least three assumptions. First, studies of defense are still underdeveloped on a global scale, compared to other topics within political science and International Relations. Secondly, the theoretical framework of Defense Studies, as a subdiscipline of International Relations, has been developed largely within the Anglo-American academy. Consequently, as an analytical tool, it is not adequate to explain the transitions that Latin American countries are going through; that is, countries that do not count on military diversification or have a global agenda similar to that of the leaders of NATO, for instance. In the third place, unlike the unraveling of authoritarianisms in Europe, Latin America lacked incentives to establish political control over the military and design democratic defense policies. While Spain, Portugal and Greece had to adapt to the external conditions imposed by the European Union and NATO, Latin American nations, which play a marginal role in global security structures, did not have those external stimuli. Moreover, at the domestic level, the necessary reforms demanded a very high political cost. Taking into account this theoretical background, this thesis explores the limited and conditioned evolution of defense policies, focusing on the case of Argentina since the transition to democracy in 1983 through 2007 (the latter date coincides with the advent of the current administration of Cristina Fernández). The analysis focuses on the way in which each one of the democratic governments since 1983 avoided the completion of reforms of defense policies. The political costs implied in assuming the conduct of defense on the one hand, and political instability, which even since the restoration of democracy posited the possibility that the armed forces might eventually be needed to reestablish order, on the other hand, have been the main reasons for the failure to carry the democratic cycle into the realm of defense. This thesis begins with an outline of the theoretical limitations of the subject. It then covers the military question in Argentina, starting with an historical overview and continuing with government and Armed Forces strategies faced by each one of the elected governments since 1983. A combination of factors resulted in the weakening of the decision-making process on defense matters. The Ministry of Defense could never overcome the partiality with which presidents tackled military issues. As a consequence, institutional strengthening and administrative transparency were never achieved in the field of defense. The inability to create a democratic defense policy, as well as lingering military autonomy, have undermined a robust consolidation of democracy, leaving spaces of conflict between the government and the Armed Forces. Although Argentina has enjoyed peace and relative stability for 30 years of democratic rule, and in the process has built prosperous relations with its neighbors, the incomplete democratization of defense policy has meant that Argentina is not a source of security but rather a consumer of security. The conclusion of the thesis argues that many of the democracies that have come into being in the past three decades confront difficulties of governance in the area of defense that are eroding their legitimacy and undermining stability in the region.

Date of Award	26 Apr 2013
Original language	Spanish
Supervisor	Nilda Nora Sainz Gsell (Director)