La naturaleza de la relación entre atención y consciencia.

Abstract

This dissertation work seeks to answer the question about the nature of the relationship between attention and consciousness. It has the specific objective of considering, based on the analysis of empirical and philosophical arguments, if there is enough justification to think that there is some kind of necessity and/or sufficiency relationship between attention and consciousness. This is a topic that is particularly appealing for a philosophical analysis, because perhaps as in no other there are, on the one hand, quite firm convictions about what it means to attend, coming from intuitive and pre-theoretical considerations about the everyday concept of attention and the commonsense psychology—which closely relate attention to consciousness—; on the other hand, however, the relevant empirical evidence to assess the matter seems to seriously challenge these convictions. The fact that there is this tension or, if you prefer, contradiction, between the “”manifest image”” and the “”scientific image””—to express it in the terminology coined by Wilfrid Sellars (1963)—makes the question of the nature of the relationship between attention and consciousness a philosophical problem par excellence. To deal with this problem, the present thesis examines the three, in principle, most plausible, empirically informed contemporary philosophical theories, in which it is positively argued that there is a necessity and/or sufficiency relationship between attention and consciousness. As shown, each of them corresponds to an argumentative and methodological strategy, which, together, seem to adequately cover the “space of reasons”. The first three chapters are eminently devoted to explaining each theory in considerable detail, and showing its corresponding strategy. Thus, chapter 1 is devoted to what might be called “”conceptual strategy”” (Smithies); the 2nd to the “empirical strategy” (Prinz); and the 3rd to what might be called “conceptual-introspective perspective” (Watzl)—a name that responds to a criticism against this theory in that chapter. In chapter 4, the longest and most important, a critical discussion is developed on the aforementioned “empirical strategy” and “conceptual strategy”, respectively. First, it is discussed in detail the issue of what can justifiably be argued that the most relevant experimental paradigms demonstrate concerning the discussion about the nature of the relationship between attention and consciousness, i.e., the so-called “inattentional blindness”, and studies in subjects with the neurological condition of “”blindsight”” and similar cases. Does inattentional blindness show that attention is necessary for consciousness? Does blindsight and similar cases contradict the claim that attention is sufficient for consciousness? This thesis defends that cases of inattentional blindness do not allow to state conclusively that attention is necessary for consciousness, although this would be the explanatory hypothesis of the data that has “more” prima-facie evidence compared to its competitors in the methodological framework of the “”inference to the best explanation.”” Regarding the second question, it is argued that, in effect, both pathological and “healthy” cases of the blindsight phenomenon contradict the claim that attention is sufficient for consciousness. Second, it is discussed what plausible result can be obtained from an articulation of the everyday concept of attention and its commonsense psychology? From this perspective, it seems reasonable to say that consciousness is necessary for attention. However, the interesting defense of this thesis seems to lead to a dilemma between the conceptual and the empirical that does not allow any firm conclusions to be drawn about the nature of the relationship between attention and consciousness. In conclusion, there does not seem to be enough justification, neither empirical nor philosophical, to claim that there is a necessity and/or sufficiency relationship between attention and consciousness.

Date of Award	28 Jun 2021
Original language	Spanish
Awarding Institution	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Supervisor	Olga Fernandez Prat (Director) & Jose Daniel Quesada Casajuana (Director)