In this work it is argued that abduction has a prescriptive aspect that has not yet been taken into account. The reasons for such an oversight lie in the fact that abduction has been investigated from the standpoint of the debates in the philosophy of science, which not only determine the conceptual framework acting as a starting point of studies but also offer a closed conception of what is science, namely the one that goes into the debate in question. At the same time, the historical reconstruction on the subject has also been carried out from that scientific perspective. The problem with this lies in the fact that such historical interpretations have also been conducted from the point of view of current science and our present understanding of abduction. In addition to moving contemporary problems to past times, when the past scientific practices are considered from the standpoint of current practices, there is the marginalization of several active elements in the former, which the then emergent science had to account for. This is also seen in how the relationship between pragmatism and abduction has been understood since, although abduction has a fundamental role in scientific matters, but even more so in those spheres in which scientific matters conflict with cultural ones. Thus, evolutionary theory, which implied changes in the scientific conception of humans and the world, altered the basis for the spiritual lives of large numbers of people. Pragmatism was born under a view of the world that saw it as an opportunity for building new lives in an unfinished reality, where personal projects can determine how the course of history will alter. This unfinished perspective of reality as a condition of possibility for thinking abduction on the table, construed as the way to acquire knowledge to the extent we adapt to novelties that immediately take place, at the same time that we build our environment with our actions. This interpretation of abduction is a pending task, and if should it not be endeavored, we would risk perpetuating a philosophical system that denies abduction itself. This situation is shown through the dichotomies that have shaped contemporary debates because abduction only can operate in a precise way when one accepts the relation between notions previously declared to be antagonistic. The ideal starting point is the EC-Model of abduction from which the contemporary conception of abduction can be approached differently, which allows the incorporation of relevant cognitive elements to understand the multimodal aspect of this reasoning. The relevance of the EC-Model lies in the fact that it is possible to reconcile other theories based on a contextual proposal of abduction. This is an essential element because it resolves a deadlock between whether the abduction should be explanatory or not. It is also an interesting proposal to address the ethical issue, as it incorporates mediators that make it possible to approach this issue. However, the main problem with this theory lies in the fact that it does not account for the role we play in shaping the context that determines the type of abduction we perform, and this is precisely where the ethical factor is of paramount importance, which only makes sense from a pragmatic perspective. Finally, the proposal to incorporate James’ radical empiricism seeks to provide the EC-Model with a theoretical framework from which to account for the holistic (and not vicious) relationship between values and descriptions of the world, the conjunction of which would give rise to a general, open and unfinished worldview, formed by the set of particular views of the world.
Argumentum in Absentia. El paper de l'abducció en filosofia de la ciència i la seva dependència de valor prescriptiu
SANS PINILLOS, A. (Author). 10 Sept 2020
Student thesis: Doctoral thesis
Student thesis: Doctoral thesis