Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

Salvador Barbera Sandez; Walter Bossert; Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero

doi:10.22004/ag.econ.321842

Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

Salvador Barbera Sandez, Walter Bossert, Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We propose to establish wine rankings using scores that depend on the differences between favorable and unfavorable opinions about each wine, according to the Borda rule. Unlike alternative approaches and specifications, this method is well-defined even if the panelists’ quality relations are not required to exhibit demanding properties such as transitivity or acyclicity. As an illustration, we apply the method to rank wines assessed by different experts and compare the resulting ranking with that obtained according to Condorcet’s method of majority voting.

Original language	English
Publisher	American Association of Wine Economists Working Paper
Number of pages	20
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.321842
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2022

Publication series

Name	AAWE Working Paper
No.	274

Keywords

Wines
Ratings
Rankings
Opinions
Borda rule

Access to Document

10.22004/ag.econ.321842Licence: C In Copyright

Cite this

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title = "Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.",

abstract = "We propose to establish wine rankings using scores that depend on the differences between favorable and unfavorable opinions about each wine, according to the Borda rule. Unlike alternative approaches and specifications, this method is well-defined even if the panelists{\textquoteright} quality relations are not required to exhibit demanding properties such as transitivity or acyclicity. As an illustration, we apply the method to rank wines assessed by different experts and compare the resulting ranking with that obtained according to Condorcet{\textquoteright}s method of majority voting.",

keywords = "Wines, Ratings, Rankings, Opinions, Borda rule",

author = "{Barbera Sandez}, Salvador and Walter Bossert and {Moreno Ternero}, {Juan de Dios}",

note = "Salvador Barber{\`a} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci{\'o}n (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grant PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR0711. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero acknowledges financial support from Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci´on (AEI) through grant PID2020-115011GB-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and from the Junta de Andaluc{\'i}a through grant P18-FR-2933",

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doi = "10.22004/ag.econ.321842",

language = "English",

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T1 - Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

AU - Barbera Sandez, Salvador

AU - Bossert, Walter

AU - Moreno Ternero, Juan de Dios

N1 - Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grant PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR0711. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero acknowledges financial support from Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci´on (AEI) through grant PID2020-115011GB-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and from the Junta de Andalucía through grant P18-FR-2933

PY - 2022/5/1

Y1 - 2022/5/1

N2 - We propose to establish wine rankings using scores that depend on the differences between favorable and unfavorable opinions about each wine, according to the Borda rule. Unlike alternative approaches and specifications, this method is well-defined even if the panelists’ quality relations are not required to exhibit demanding properties such as transitivity or acyclicity. As an illustration, we apply the method to rank wines assessed by different experts and compare the resulting ranking with that obtained according to Condorcet’s method of majority voting.

AB - We propose to establish wine rankings using scores that depend on the differences between favorable and unfavorable opinions about each wine, according to the Borda rule. Unlike alternative approaches and specifications, this method is well-defined even if the panelists’ quality relations are not required to exhibit demanding properties such as transitivity or acyclicity. As an illustration, we apply the method to rank wines assessed by different experts and compare the resulting ranking with that obtained according to Condorcet’s method of majority voting.

KW - Wines

KW - Ratings

KW - Rankings

KW - Opinions

KW - Borda rule

UR - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/321842?ln=en

U2 - 10.22004/ag.econ.321842

DO - 10.22004/ag.econ.321842

M3 - Working paper

T3 - AAWE Working Paper

BT - Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

PB - American Association of Wine Economists Working Paper

ER -

Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

Cite this

Wine Rankings and the Borda Method.

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

Cite this