Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	172-174
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	115
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2012

Keywords

Naive players
School choice
Veil of ignorance
Welfare

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

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title = "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice",

abstract = "Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. {\textcopyright} 2011 Elsevier B.V.",

keywords = "Naive players, School choice, Veil of ignorance, Welfare",

author = "Jose Apesteguia and Ballester, \{Miguel A.\}",

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AU - Ballester, Miguel A.

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N2 - Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

AB - Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Naive players

KW - School choice

KW - Veil of ignorance

KW - Welfare

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855775696

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

M3 - Article

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VL - 115

SP - 172

EP - 174

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Abstract

Keywords

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