Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)172-174
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2012


  • Naive players
  • School choice
  • Veil of ignorance
  • Welfare


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