Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution

Jan Bouda, Matej Pivoluska, Martin Plesch, Colin Wilmott

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of device and channel imperfection. In this paper we show that the security of quantum key distribution protocols is ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions via different side channels. © 2012 American Physical Society.
Original languageEnglish
Article number062308
JournalPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Volume86
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 7 Dec 2012

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this