TY - JOUR
T1 - Voting under Constraints
AU - Barberà, Salvador
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Neme, Alejandro
PY - 1997/10/1
Y1 - 1997/10/1
N2 - We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the "intersection property," which becomes increasingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71. © 1997 Academic Press.
AB - We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the "intersection property," which becomes increasingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71. © 1997 Academic Press.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301
DO - https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301
M3 - Article
VL - 76
SP - 298
EP - 321
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
ER -