Voting under Constraints

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

50 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the "intersection property," which becomes increasingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71. © 1997 Academic Press.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)298-321
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume76
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 1997

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