Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function

Daniel Cardona-Coll

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review


    This paper analyzes voting by veto procedures in the context of a pure sharing problem. It is shown that the direct intuition about these voting mechanisms fails: the veto power of the players does not by itself make players act in an equitable manner. If the compromise function yields a constant compromise alternative, then it plays the role of a threat point and the behavior of the players in making proposals tends to be selfish. However, if it depends on the individual proposals, and selects a real compromise among them, then egalitarian proposals can be achieved as the unique subgame perfect equilibria with symmetric proposals of the game. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)101-113
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1997


    • Bargaining
    • Compromise
    • Veto
    • Voting


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