Abstract
This paper analyzes voting by veto procedures in the context of a pure sharing problem. It is shown that the direct intuition about these voting mechanisms fails: the veto power of the players does not by itself make players act in an equitable manner. If the compromise function yields a constant compromise alternative, then it plays the role of a threat point and the behavior of the players in making proposals tends to be selfish. However, if it depends on the individual proposals, and selects a real compromise among them, then egalitarian proposals can be achieved as the unique subgame perfect equilibria with symmetric proposals of the game. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 101-113 |
Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Volume | 33 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 1997 |
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Compromise
- Veto
- Voting