Voting by committees under constraints

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-205
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume122
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2005

Keywords

  • Additive and separable preferences
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Voting

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