Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players

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6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give a characterization of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game in which players use the long-run average of the one-shot-game payoffs as the overall payoff of the repeated game and individual actions are not discernible by others. In contrast to the 'Anti-Folk Theorem' equilibria may exist even though the one-shot game has no equilibrium. © 1993.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)243-264
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume22
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1993

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