Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players

Jordi Massó

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90010-I

Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players

Jordi Massó

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give a characterization of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game in which players use the long-run average of the one-shot-game payoffs as the overall payoff of the repeated game and individual actions are not discernible by others. In contrast to the 'Anti-Folk Theorem' equilibria may exist even though the one-shot game has no equilibrium. © 1993.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	243-264
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	22
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90010-I
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1993

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abstract = "We give a characterization of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game in which players use the long-run average of the one-shot-game payoffs as the overall payoff of the repeated game and individual actions are not discernible by others. In contrast to the 'Anti-Folk Theorem' equilibria may exist even though the one-shot game has no equilibrium. {\textcopyright} 1993.",

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AB - We give a characterization of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game in which players use the long-run average of the one-shot-game payoffs as the overall payoff of the repeated game and individual actions are not discernible by others. In contrast to the 'Anti-Folk Theorem' equilibria may exist even though the one-shot game has no equilibrium. © 1993.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90010-I

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90010-I

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JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

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