Trimmed equilibrium

Valeska Groenert

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) imposes stronger rationality conditions than necessary to ensure equilibrium outcomes are consistent with its concept. This is demonstrated by characterizing the maximal collection of information sets at which play is irrelevant for an outcome's consistency with SPE. It is shown that, without affecting the set of equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium conditions can be trimmed by relaxing all conditions on this maximal collection. Therefore a trimmed SPE is a tight version of SPE. However, because its conditions are weaker, trimmed SPE might exist even if SPE does not. This is demonstrated in an application. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)99-114
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Volume42
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

    Keywords

    • Equilibrium refinements
    • Nonexistence of equilibrium
    • Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Trimmed equilibrium'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this