The war of attrition with incomplete information

Clara Ponsati, József Sákovics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable. © 1995.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-254
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume29
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1995

Keywords

  • Concession games
  • War of attrition

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