The war of attrition with incomplete information

Clara Ponsati; József Sákovics

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00771-Y

The war of attrition with incomplete information

Clara Ponsati, József Sákovics

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable. © 1995.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	239-254
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	29
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00771-Y
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1995

Keywords

Concession games
War of attrition

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abstract = "We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable. {\textcopyright} 1995.",

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The war of attrition with incomplete information

Abstract

Keywords

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