The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies

David Pérez-Castrillo, Chaoran Sun *

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We define the proportional ordinal Shapley (the POSh) solution, an ordinal concept for pure exchange economies in the spirit of the Shapley value. Our construction is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell's (1989) characterization of the Shapley value with the aid of a potential function. The POSh exists and is unique and essentially single-valued for a fairly general class of economies. It satisfies individual rationality, anonymity, and properties similar to the null-player and null-player out properties in transferable utility games. The POSh is immune to agents' manipulation of their initial endowments: It is not D-manipulable and does not suffer from the transfer paradox. Moreover, we characterize the POSh through a Harsanyi's (1959) system of dividends and, when agents' preferences are homothetic, through a weighted balanced contributions property à la Myerson (1980).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)96-109
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2022


  • Exchange economy
  • Ordinal solution
  • Potential
  • Shapley value


Dive into the research topics of 'The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this