The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

Matias Iaryczower, Andrea Mattozzi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends on both the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model with an analysis of the competitive effects of campaign spending limits. We show that under some conditions spending caps can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)591-619
    JournalEconomic Theory
    Volume49
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2012

    Keywords

    • Campaign limits
    • Campaign spending
    • Elections
    • Political parties

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