TY - JOUR
T1 - The price effects of reducing payment card interchange fees
AU - Shabgard, Bita
AU - Asensio, Javier
N1 - Funding was provided by Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital, Gobierno de España, (Grant No. RTI2018-097434-B-I00) and by Beatriz Galindo research project (BG20/00079).
We thank Angel Luis López, Alfredo Martín− Oliver, Jozsef Sakovics, Abel Lucena, and Pau Balart for comments, as well as participants at SAEe 2021 (Barcelona) and JEI 2022 (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria), seminar participants at Universitat de les Illes Balears, as well as the referees and editor in charge of this paper. All errors are the authors’ unique responsibility. This work has been supported by the Beatriz Galindo grants and project RTI2018− 097434− B− I00 of Spain's Ministry of Science and Innovation.
PY - 2023/4/27
Y1 - 2023/4/27
N2 - In this paper we empirically address the issue of whether reductions in card payment interchange fees have a significant impact on prices paid by consumers. The answer to this question is at the core of most competition policy cases and regulations that have been applied to card payment markets. Relying on Rochet and Tirole’s (RandJEcon 33:549–570, 2002) model of this sector as a two-sided market, we identify the two channels through which interchange fee reductions may influence retail prices: the impact on cards’ demand and on the merchant service charge, which may be passed through to retail prices. We use Spanish sectoral data to estimate the resulting system of equations. Our results imply that a 1% reduction in the level of the interchange fee leads to a long run 0.17% reduction in the retail price index. Such outcome is almost exclusively the result of the interchange fees being passed through as lower prices by merchants, as we find that they have a negligible impact on payment cards’ usage.
AB - In this paper we empirically address the issue of whether reductions in card payment interchange fees have a significant impact on prices paid by consumers. The answer to this question is at the core of most competition policy cases and regulations that have been applied to card payment markets. Relying on Rochet and Tirole’s (RandJEcon 33:549–570, 2002) model of this sector as a two-sided market, we identify the two channels through which interchange fee reductions may influence retail prices: the impact on cards’ demand and on the merchant service charge, which may be passed through to retail prices. We use Spanish sectoral data to estimate the resulting system of equations. Our results imply that a 1% reduction in the level of the interchange fee leads to a long run 0.17% reduction in the retail price index. Such outcome is almost exclusively the result of the interchange fees being passed through as lower prices by merchants, as we find that they have a negligible impact on payment cards’ usage.
KW - Card payment network
KW - Interchange fee
KW - Retail prices
KW - Two-sided markets
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85153864060&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/65f5ba7d-374e-3cb8-a81f-f2a0669ad75b/
U2 - 10.1007/s13209-023-00278-y
DO - 10.1007/s13209-023-00278-y
M3 - Article
SN - 1869-4187
VL - 14
SP - 189
EP - 221
JO - SERIEs
JF - SERIEs
IS - 2
ER -