La presencia de la administración pública en cárteles privados: La regulación administrativo-colusoria

Translated title of the contribution: The presence of public administration in private cartels: The administrative-collusory regulation

Carlos Padrós Reig*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The increasing complexity of the legal order provokes cases of inconsistency between Administrative law and Competition Law. We analize the case of the Sherry Wine cartels where mesures of sectorial regulation incur in the creation of a price cartel. This conduct is fined by competition authorities and judicial review of CNC Resolution restores the preference of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations of cartel participants who believe in the law-abiding nature of their conduct.

Translated title of the contributionThe presence of public administration in private cartels: The administrative-collusory regulation
Original languageSpanish
JournalRevista General de Derecho Administrativo
Volume32
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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