The informational value of incumbency

Carmen Beviá, Humberto Llavador

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper exploits the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. We propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage, ideological bias, and terms in office. Our argument emphasizes that incumbency affects candidates' chances of winning even if they had no opportunity to strategically utilize policies. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)773-796
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2009

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The informational value of incumbency'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this