The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science

Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar, Thomas Sturm

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11 Citations (Scopus)


While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand "big science" or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-18
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014


  • Distributed Cognition
  • Extended Cognition
  • Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • Philosophy of Science


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