Abstract
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 56-77 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 89 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2015 |
Keywords
- Division problem
- Single-peaked preferences