The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Q-value introduced by Bergantiños, Casas-Méndez, and Vázquez-Brage (2000). The main difference being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We show that it is well defined on the class of totally essential and non-level games. We propose an extensive-form game whose subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs coincide with the Chi-compromise value.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-286
JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume56
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2002

Keywords

  • Compromise value
  • NTU game

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