Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus, Szilvia Pápai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to students, or offices to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because tentative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. The characterized rules assign the objects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments". © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)329-339
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2002

Keywords

  • Indivisible objects
  • Population-monotonicity
  • Strategy-proofness

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