Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences

S. Barberà; B. Peleg

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832918

Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences

S. Barberà, B. Peleg

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

81 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove that all nondictatorial voting schemes whose range has more than two alternatives will be manipulable, when their domain is restricted to the set of all continuous preferences over alternatives. Our result neither implies nor is implied by the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, except if the number of alternatives is finite, when they coincide. A new, direct line of reasoning is used in the proof. It is presented in an introductory section, which may be useful in classroom situations. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	31-38
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832918
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 1990

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abstract = "We prove that all nondictatorial voting schemes whose range has more than two alternatives will be manipulable, when their domain is restricted to the set of all continuous preferences over alternatives. Our result neither implies nor is implied by the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, except if the number of alternatives is finite, when they coincide. A new, direct line of reasoning is used in the proof. It is presented in an introductory section, which may be useful in classroom situations. {\textcopyright} 1990 Springer-Verlag.",

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AB - We prove that all nondictatorial voting schemes whose range has more than two alternatives will be manipulable, when their domain is restricted to the set of all continuous preferences over alternatives. Our result neither implies nor is implied by the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, except if the number of alternatives is finite, when they coincide. A new, direct line of reasoning is used in the proof. It is presented in an introductory section, which may be useful in classroom situations. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.

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