Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

S. Barberà; J. Massó; S. Serizawa

doi:https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643

Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

S. Barberà, J. Massó, S. Serizawa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)].

Original language	English
Article number	Y970643
Pages (from-to)	272-291
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	25
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643
Publication status	Published - Nov 1998

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https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142827

Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional
Barberà, S., Caballero Jurado, J., Villar Febré, J. P., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Cardona Coll, D., Gonzalez Maestre, M., Jelovac ., I., Macho Stadler, I., Martínez Giralt, X., Massó, J., Olivella, P., Perez Castrillo, J. D., Ponsati Obiols, C., Vila Carnicero, F. J., Berga Colom, D. & Bogomolnaia, A.
15/12/97 → 15/12/99
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

@article{d4e0a45a1b8f493990a8876c9c08970c,

title = "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges",

abstract = "Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barber{\`a}, Mass{\'o}, and Neme (1997)].",

author = "S. Barber{\`a} and J. Mass{\'o} and S. Serizawa",

note = "The work of Salvador Barber{\`a} and Jordi Mass{\'o} is partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Spanish Ministry of Education (DGICYT) and SGR96-75 from the Generalitat de Catalunya (CIRIT)",

year = "1998",

month = nov,

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643",

language = "English",

volume = "25",

pages = "272--291",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

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T1 - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

AU - Barberà, S.

AU - Massó, J.

AU - Serizawa, S.

N1 - The work of Salvador Barberà and Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Spanish Ministry of Education (DGICYT) and SGR96-75 from the Generalitat de Catalunya (CIRIT)

PY - 1998/11

Y1 - 1998/11

N2 - Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)].

AB - Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)].

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643

DO - https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 25

SP - 272

EP - 291

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

M1 - Y970643

ER -

Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

Abstract

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Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional

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