Strategy-proof allotment rules

Salvador Barberà; Matthew O. Jackson; Alejandro Neme

doi:https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0511

Strategy-proof allotment rules

Salvador Barberà, Matthew O. Jackson, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but which may treat individuals asymmetrically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 1997 Academic Press.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-21
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	18
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0511
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1997

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abstract = "We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but which may treat individuals asymmetrically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. {\textcopyright} 1997 Academic Press.",

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AB - We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but which may treat individuals asymmetrically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 1997 Academic Press.

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