Abstract
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets", viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 75-106 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 121 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2005 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
-
SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
Keywords
- Couples
- Matching
- Responsiveness
- Stability
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Stable matchings and preferences of couples'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver