Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    61 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets", viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)75-106
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume121
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005

    Keywords

    • Couples
    • Matching
    • Responsiveness
    • Stability

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