Stability and voting by committees with exit

Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)229-247
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume23
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2004

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    Berga, D., Bergantiños, G., Massó, J., & Neme, A. (2004). Stability and voting by committees with exit. Social Choice and Welfare, 23, 229-247. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6