TY - JOUR
T1 - Stability and voting by committees with exit
AU - Berga, Dolors
AU - Bergantiños, Gustavo
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Neme, Alejandro
PY - 2004/10/1
Y1 - 2004/10/1
N2 - We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
AB - We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 23
SP - 229
EP - 247
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
ER -