Projects per year
Abstract
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples' preferences are "responsive," i.e., when Gale and Shapleyís (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | BSE Working Papers |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2005 |
Publication series
| Name | BSE Working Paper |
|---|---|
| No. | 78 |
Keywords
- Couples
- Matching
- Stability
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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"Groups, networks and coalitions in collective decision-making"
Massó, J. (Principal Investigator), Barberà, S. (Principal Investigator 2), Calvó Armengol, A. (Researcher on contract), Haeringer , G. (Researcher on contract), Klaus ., B.-E. (Researcher on contract), Klijn , F. (Researcher on contract), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Dutta, B. (Investigator), Jackson, M. (Investigator), Neme, A. J. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCYT)
1/12/02 → 1/12/05
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants