Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)


Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: J41. © 2000 Academic Press.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)91-105
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2000


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