Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation:The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and
the successive procedure. We show that a well-known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable
than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to
arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for
manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority
quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority
quota nor any other quota uniformly minimize the scope of manipulation,
once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about
agenda manipulation.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 6 Oct 2015

Publication series

NameSSRN-id2483329

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