TY - JOUR
T1 - Semiassisted Signal Authentication for Galileo: Proof of Concept and Results
AU - Fernandez-Hernandez, Ignacio
AU - Winkel, Jón
AU - O'Driscoll, Cillian
AU - Cancela, Simón
AU - Terris-Gallego, Rafael
AU - López-Salcedo, Jose A.
AU - Seco-Granados, Gonzalo
AU - Chiara, Andrea Dalla
AU - Sarto, Carlo
AU - Blonski, Daniel
AU - Blas, Javier de
N1 - DBLP License: DBLP's bibliographic metadata records provided through http://dblp.org/ are distributed under a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Although the bibliographic metadata records are provided consistent with CC0 1.0 Dedication, the content described by the metadata records is not. Content may be subject to copyright, rights of privacy, rights of publicity and other restrictions.
PY - 2023/8
Y1 - 2023/8
N2 - A semiassisted global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) authentication concept is proposed, with two main advantages. First, it can be implemented in a GNSS without modifications to the signal plan, provided that the GNSS can transmit an encrypted signal and an open signal with unpredictable and verifiable bits regularly. Second, it can work in a receiver for up to several days without any assistance or the possession of a private key, at the expense of some authentication latency. In this concept, parts of the encrypted signal to be transmitted in the future are re-encrypted, published, and downloaded in the receiver. Some seconds after transmission, the satellite openly broadcasts the decryption key, and the receiver performs the a-posteriori correlation with the encrypted signal. The concept is particularized for the Galileo system as Galileo assisted commercial authentication service, based on OSNMA in E1B for the decryption keys and E6C for the encrypted signal. An end-to-end procedure for measurement authentication is proposed and tested, showing its viability.
AB - A semiassisted global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) authentication concept is proposed, with two main advantages. First, it can be implemented in a GNSS without modifications to the signal plan, provided that the GNSS can transmit an encrypted signal and an open signal with unpredictable and verifiable bits regularly. Second, it can work in a receiver for up to several days without any assistance or the possession of a private key, at the expense of some authentication latency. In this concept, parts of the encrypted signal to be transmitted in the future are re-encrypted, published, and downloaded in the receiver. Some seconds after transmission, the satellite openly broadcasts the decryption key, and the receiver performs the a-posteriori correlation with the encrypted signal. The concept is particularized for the Galileo system as Galileo assisted commercial authentication service, based on OSNMA in E1B for the decryption keys and E6C for the encrypted signal. An end-to-end procedure for measurement authentication is proposed and tested, showing its viability.
UR - https://doi.org/10.1109/TAES.2023.3243587
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85149361033&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/aaaa08cd-4fe4-3f0c-8aa3-b22ec0eabf95/
U2 - 10.1109/taes.2023.3243587
DO - 10.1109/taes.2023.3243587
M3 - Article
SN - 0018-9251
VL - 59
SP - 4393
EP - 4404
JO - IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
IS - 4
ER -