Self-selection consistent functions

Salvador Barberà, Carmen Beviá

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing efficient allocation consistent rules. We also explore whether such rules may in addition respect the Condorcet criterion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D7, D71. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-277
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume105
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

Keywords

  • Allocation consistency
  • Condorcet criterion
  • Participation
  • Social choice rules

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