Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

Clara Ponsatí, József Sákovics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

40 Citations (Scopus)


In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)667-672
JournalEconomic Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1998


Dive into the research topics of 'Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this