Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-28
Number of pages	28
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	131
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008
Publication status	Published - Jan 2022

Keywords

Allocation problems
Ex post incentive compatibility
Interdependent types
Jury decisions
Mechanisms
Pareto efficiency
Preference functions
Strategy-proofness

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10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008Licence: C In Copyright

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title = "Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models",

abstract = "We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.",

keywords = "Allocation problems, Ex post incentive compatibility, Interdependent types, Jury decisions, Mechanisms, Pareto efficiency, Preference functions, Strategy-proofness",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno",

note = "Salvador Barber{\`a} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci{\'o}n (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and (SEV-2011-0075), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2017-83534-P and PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR—0711. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grants ECO2016-76255-P and PID2019-106642GB-I00. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges the support from the Consejer{\'i}a de Econom{\'i}a y Conocimiento, Junta de Andaluc{\'i}a through grant UMA18-FEDERJA-130. The latter two authors thank the MOMA network. The usual disclaimer applies.",

year = "2022",

month = jan,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008",

language = "English",

volume = "131",

pages = "1--28",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

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T1 - Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Berga, Dolors

AU - Moreno, Bernardo

N1 - Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and (SEV-2011-0075), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2017-83534-P and PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR—0711. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grants ECO2016-76255-P and PID2019-106642GB-I00. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges the support from the Consejería de Economía y Conocimiento, Junta de Andalucía through grant UMA18-FEDERJA-130. The latter two authors thank the MOMA network. The usual disclaimer applies.

PY - 2022/1

Y1 - 2022/1

N2 - We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.

AB - We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.

KW - Allocation problems

KW - Ex post incentive compatibility

KW - Interdependent types

KW - Jury decisions

KW - Mechanisms

KW - Pareto efficiency

KW - Preference functions

KW - Strategy-proofness

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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85119176755

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 131

SP - 1

EP - 28

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

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Keywords

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Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Abstract

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

Elección social, redes y bienestar: teoría y aplicaciones

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