Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)


We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments.".
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)545-560
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2004


  • Indivisible objects
  • Resource-monotonicity


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