Reserve prices without commitment

Roberto Burguet; József Sákovics

doi:10.1006/game.1996.0063

Reserve prices without commitment

Roberto Burguet, József Sákovics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When potential bidders in an auction have to incur a cost to prepare their bids and thus to learn their valuations, imposing a reserve price and announcing that in case no bid is submitted there will be another auction without a reserve price is both revenue and welfare improving. Reserve prices that induce less than maximum entry in the first auction may be optimal. Also, entry fees are not necessarily better instruments than reserve prices. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	149-164
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	15
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0063
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1996

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