Reserve prices without commitment

Roberto Burguet, József Sákovics

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    When potential bidders in an auction have to incur a cost to prepare their bids and thus to learn their valuations, imposing a reserve price and announcing that in case no bid is submitted there will be another auction without a reserve price is both revenue and welfare improving. Reserve prices that induce less than maximum entry in the first auction may be optimal. Also, entry fees are not necessarily better instruments than reserve prices. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)149-164
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume15
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1996

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