Regulating disinformation: Poll embargo and electoral coordination

Ignacio Lago, Marc Guinjoan, Sandra Bermúdez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© The Author 2015. This article examines the political consequences of pre-Election Day poll restrictions. Our argument is that laws forbidding the publication of polling results hamper voters' electoral coordination when the information environment is more complex. We rely on aggregated data from elections in 46 democracies to show that the number of wasted votes increases in countries with highly fragmented party systems when pre-Election Day polls are restricted. This evidence is supported with individual data from Internet surveys conducted by the Making Electoral Democracy Work project during election campaigns in Canada and Spain.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)932-951
JournalPublic Opinion Quarterly
Volume79
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

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