TY - JOUR
T1 - Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games
AU - Brandts, Jordi
AU - Sola Belda, Carles
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - We investigate experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e., whether choices are "menu dependent." In simple sequential games we analyze whether reactions to a certain benchmark outcome are influenced by changes in the payoffs of another outcome, not attainable at that time, called the "reference point." Our data provide evidence that is favorable to the notion of menu dependence. Alterations of the reference point can lead to quantitatively significant changes in behavior at the benchmark outcome. The behavior we observe can be interpreted in terms of negative reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C91, C92, C72. © 2001 Academic Press.
AB - We investigate experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e., whether choices are "menu dependent." In simple sequential games we analyze whether reactions to a certain benchmark outcome are influenced by changes in the payoffs of another outcome, not attainable at that time, called the "reference point." Our data provide evidence that is favorable to the notion of menu dependence. Alterations of the reference point can lead to quantitatively significant changes in behavior at the benchmark outcome. The behavior we observe can be interpreted in terms of negative reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C91, C92, C72. © 2001 Academic Press.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0818
DO - https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0818
M3 - Article
VL - 36
SP - 138
EP - 157
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -