Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules

Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-268
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume8
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2003

Keywords

  • Probabilistic rules
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Uniform allocations

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